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Abstract
One domestic ﬁrm and one foreign ﬁrm must decide when to
introduce their new product to the home market. The home
government may apply an import tariﬀ, an administrative de-
lay, or both to the product of the foreign ﬁrm. We show that
the, while both the tariﬀ and administrative delay can ensure the
socially optimal timing of entry, the administrative delay is the
less eﬃcient instrument for maximising home welfare. If trade
liberalization constrains the import tariﬀ to be below its domesti-
cally optimal level, we show that the optimal administrative delay
leads to lower levels of world welfare than the optimal tariﬀ, so
that trade liberalization can be welfare decreasing.
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1 Introduction
International trade in goods and services is restricted by a variety of gov-
ernmental policies. Most prominent among these are trade policies that
are explicitly designed to discriminate against products that are produced
abroad. Trade policies take many forms from explicit tariﬀs or quotas to
voluntary export restraints or the enforcement of anti-dumping laws. Inter-
national trade ﬂows are also impeded by policies that apply to both foreign
and domestic ﬁrms, such as tax policies, intellectual property laws, safety
standards or technical standards. These ”internal” policies can aﬀect trade
in basically two ways. Firstly, the policies can be applied in a discrimina-
tory manner: the relevant authorities can systematically take more time or
be less accommodating when dealing with foreign products or foreign ﬁrms.
Secondly, domestic ﬁrms might simply be more familiar with the local pro-
cedures so that local regulation is less of a burden for them than for their
foreign competitors. In this case a country can discriminate against foreign
ﬁrms by adopting idiosyncratic rules and ignoring attempts to standardize
administrative procedures across countries.
There is some evidence of systematic pro-domestic bias in the application
of domestic policies. For example, the fact that most companies obtain
signiﬁcantly more patents at home that in other important markets suggests
that they perceive the costs of ﬁling and litigating abroad as higher than at
Administrative Delays as Barriers to Trade 2
home.1 There also appear to be some systematic diﬀerences in the speed of
administrative review of new products. The work of Dranove and Meltzer
(1994) suggests that administrative delays may be greater for foreign-owned
drug ﬁrms, and that the additional administrative delay suﬀered by foreign
ﬁrms diﬀers across countries. For example, they ﬁnd that French-made drugs
have a ”dramatic” advantage of approval within France, while German-made
drugs have a large advantage in Germany. US made drugs are found to be
approved two to three years earlier in the United States than in France,
the United Kingdom or Germany. Such bias can be privately and socially
costly. For example, Gieringer (1985) estimates that a one year delay in the
introduction of new drugs results in between 32,000 and 76,000 additional
deaths per decade.
This paper analyzes the special case of administrative delays in the ap-
proval of new product designs as a barrier to trade. Because we are interested
in the issue of delays, we choose a model with a signiﬁcant timing dimen-
sion: we study a two-country framework where two ﬁrms, one domestic and
the other foreign, must decide when to introduce their new product into the
market. By waiting longer a ﬁrm increases the quality of its product but
forgoes a current stream of proﬁts. In the sub-game perfect equilibrium, the
1Another possible explanation for the discrepancy is that foreign companies feel that
their products will not sell as well abroad because of the consumers’ preference for domestic
products. Expecting fewer sales, foreign companies would be less likely to invest in
obtaining the patent even if the cost of patenting were the same at home and abroad.
Still, this does not explain why international ﬁrms based in small countries would still
have a greater propensity to patent at home than in much larger markets like the US.
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timing of introduction and the quality of both the domestic and the foreign
goods are determined endogenously. The home government may apply an
import tariﬀ, an administrative delay or both to the product of the foreign
ﬁrm. An administrative delay imposes a waiting period between the time
when the quality of the foreign product is determined and the time when the
product can actually be sold. Our main interest is the diﬀerential eﬀect of
the tariﬀ and the administrative delay on the timing of new product intro-
ductions and the resulting change in home, foreign and world welfare. We
attempt to answer three questions. First, can delays be an eﬀective form of
trade policy and, if the answer is ”yes”, what would an optimal delay policy
look like? Second, how do administrative delays compare to traditional trade
instruments such as a unit import tariﬀ? Are these instruments equally ef-
ﬁcient from the point of view of the home country? Do they aﬀect world
welfare in a similar manner? Finally, how would the home government and
the ﬁrms react to a trade liberalization that imposes limits on the level of
import tariﬀs? How would such trade liberalization aﬀect the endogenous
quality of the products? Would it necessarily improve world welfare?
The last question is of particular importance. As multilateral trade
agreements progressively limit the use of the more traditional trade policy
tools, policy makers are likely to make greater use of instruments that remain
unregulated or that are harder to monitor for evidence of discrimination. In
fact, the virtual elimination of formal import quotas and the strict limits
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imposed on most import tariﬀs seems to be one of the reasons behind the
proliferation of voluntary export restraint agreements and the ﬂourishing of
anti-dumping actions. The potential for substitution has long been recog-
nized by the Gatt/WTO as the later rounds of discussion have tried-without
much success- to address the issue of internal barriers to international trade.
Our results suggest that administrative delays are a less eﬃcient instru-
ments for maximizing home welfare than tariﬀs. With a tariﬀ, the home
government can aﬀect the timing of entry to ensure that the domestic ﬁrm
moves ﬁrst at the socially optimal date. Although an optimally chosen delay
can achieve the same pattern of introduction, it does not yield any tariﬀ rev-
enues. As a result, if the tariﬀ may be set optimally, administrative delays
are not used in a discriminatory manner. Delays also lead to lower world-wide
welfare than tariﬀs. This is because delays impose a period of unproductive
waiting, while a tariﬀ lets the foreign ﬁrm improve the quality of its prod-
uct right up to the date of introduction. If trade liberalization constrains
the import tariﬀ to be below its domestically optimal level, discriminatory
administrative delays may become part of the optimal policy of the home
country. As the optimal delay policy leads to lower levels of world welfare
than the optimal tariﬀ, trade liberalization can be welfare decreasing.
To our knowledge, the formal analysis of administrative delays is new to
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the literature on international trade.2 On the other hand, the eﬀect of tariﬀ
protection on the optimal timing of technology adoption has been studied in
two recent papers.3 Myagiwa and Ohno (1995) discuss how import restric-
tions can aﬀect a home ﬁrm’s incentives to ”close the technology gap” with
respect to a foreign competitor. They use a technology adoption model that
is similar to ours4 but assume that the foreign ﬁrm has adopted the new
technology already. They then focus on how tariﬀs and quotas would aﬀect
the date at which the domestic competitor would also adopt. Hence, they do
not study the instrument that is the focus of our work, the administrative
delay. Further, they cannot examine, as we do, how trade policies inﬂu-
ence the order of technological adoption between foreign and domestic ﬁrms.
Chuman and Kusumoto (1995) extend the analysis of Myagiwa and Ohno to
compare price and quantity setting competition under various speciﬁcations
of demands. They show that the eﬀect of tariﬀ protection on the adoption
behavior of the domestic ﬁrm does, indeed, depend on the nature of compe-
tition as well as on the precise shapes of demand and cost functions. We
eschew such complications by assuming that consumer demand is perfectly
inelastic at any point in time. This simpliﬁcation has numerous advantages.
First, as mentioned above, it makes it possible to study the timing decisions
2Noll (1985) provides a synthesis of the work of many authors from other social sciences
who have studied administrative delays.
3Also see Brander and Spencer (1983) for an analysis of the relationship between trade
policies and innovation.
4They assume that the cost of adopting the new technology decreases over time while
we assume that the quality of the product increases over time. The basic logic of these
two classes of models is very similar.
Administrative Delays as Barriers to Trade 6
of both the foreign and the domestic ﬁrms. Indeed, the interaction between
the ﬁrms’ adoption strategies is central to our analysis. Second, with inelas-
tic demands the proﬁt-maximizing behavior of a single ﬁrm would be socially
optimal. This ensures that all distortions arising in our model are rooted
in the rivalry between the domestic and foreign producers. To investigate
the signiﬁcance of this assumption, we highlight the results that are robust
to relaxing this assumption in a latter part of the paper. Summarizing, our
model contributes a ﬁrst formal analysis of administrative delays as trade
barriers and illustrates in detail a mechanism by which these delays could
aﬀect world and country welfare in a model of endogenous timing of tech-
nological adoption. A further contribution of the paper is to study both
the case of drastic and partial trade liberalization on the use of tariﬀs and
administrative delays. As far as we know, this is novel to the literature
evaluating the substitution from traditional to non-traditional trade barri-
ers, and allows us to study the case where both instruments could be used
concurrently.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents our bench-
mark free-trade model. Section 2 analyses the case where the home country
has only the tariﬀ at its disposal while Section 3 considers the exclusive use
of administrative delays. Section 4 compares the optimal policies of Sections
2 and 3 and examines the eﬀect of trade liberalization, allowing the home
government to use both instruments simultaneously. Section 5 discusses the
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robustness of our results to changes in the timing of the policy decisions and
in the type of demand functions. Section 6 concludes. Most proofs have
been relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model and Benchmark Case
Two ﬁrms, A and B, must determine when to introduce their product in the
market. Before time zero, neither ﬁrm is ready to sell a product that would
be acceptable to consumers. From time zero on, each ﬁrm can introduce a
product that incorporates the ”state of the art” technology at the time of
introduction. The rate of technological progress is exogenous to the ﬁrms.
The longer the ﬁrm waits, the higher the quality of the good it can sell. More
speciﬁcally, the quality of the good which is introduced at time ti is qi = θti.
Once a ﬁrm has introduced its product, its quality is ﬁxed forever. This
captures the idea that a ﬁrm cannot keep incorporating new technology into
its product as fast once the product has been introduced and the basic design
choices have been made.5 Finally, each ﬁrm can make only a single product
introduction. The analysis would be essentially unchanged if ﬁrms were
allowed to continuously incorporate improvements after the date of initial
introduction as long as the rate of quality improvement drops from θ to θL <
θ6. One could also accommodate a larger number of discrete introductions
5While we believe that this assumption is reasonable, it clearly does not apply to every
industry. In particular, in industries where innovation beneﬁts signiﬁcantly from the
input of customers, the rate of product improvement might in fact be larger once the ﬁrst
generation of the product has been introduced.
6See Dutta and Rustichini (1993).
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as long as the total number of introductions available to each ﬁrm were
exogenous. This would, however, signiﬁcantly complicate the calculations
and detract from the clarity of the presentation7 without altering the main
results. Once a ﬁrm has introduced its version of the new good, it can
produce at a constant marginal cost, c. For simplicity, we set c to zero.
Firms compete in prices if both produce in the market.
At each time, indexed by x, a mass, N, of new identical consumers arrives
in the market. Each of these consumers buys at most one unit of the good.
Either this purchase occurs immediately or the consumer disappears from
the market forever8. A consumer who buys one unit of good j at time x
enjoys beneﬁts of Vj = qj where qj is the quality of good j. The products of
the two ﬁrms are not horizontally diﬀerentiated so that all consumers always
prefer the good that oﬀers them the highest quality price diﬀerence, qj−pj.
We assume that all consumers are located in country A, to which we will
refer as the home, or domestic, market. Firm A is located in country A
as well, whereas ﬁrm B is located abroad and exports to market A. In our
baseline case, country A has no policy instruments at its disposal to aﬀect
the ﬁrms’ behavior.
7On the other hand, this type of timing model does not easily accommodate endoge-
nously determined numbers of discrete introductions. In fact, we are not aware of any
oligopoly model where both the number of introductions (or innovations) and their timing
(or the intensity of R&D) are endogenous.
8This assumption is made to rule out strategic waiting behavior on the part of con-
sumers, as our focus is on strategic waiting by ﬁrms.
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We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the continuous time
game9. The ﬁrst point to understand is that the two ﬁrms will never de-
cide to introduce their products simultaneously. Simultaneous introduction
would drive down equilibrium prices to zero, as both ﬁrms would oﬀer ho-
mogenous products of identical quality. In any equilibrium, then, there will
be a leader, who introduces ﬁrst, and a follower. Considering the problem of
the second mover, the introduction decision is determined by maximizing the
discounted stream of proﬁts that accrues to the follower after entry. Since
the follower introduces later, it oﬀers the higher quality product. It can then
charge a price equal to the diﬀerence between the value it oﬀers, Vf , and the
value oﬀered by the leader, Vl, and still make all sales. If we deﬁne tf as
the delay between the introduction date of the leader and the follower, then
the revenue earned by the follower per period is:
PfN = N [Vf − Vl] = N [qf − ql] = θtfN
and the stream of proﬁts of the follower discounted back to the time of
entry of the leader is:
πf = e
−rtf ∫∞
0
θtfNe
−rxdx = e−rtf θNtf
r
Maximizing this with respect to tf , we obtain an optimal delay of t
∗
f =
1
r
.
9This is a slight abuse of language since the concept of subgame perfection is not
properly deﬁned in continuous time. One should think of our results as applying to the
limit of a discrete time game as the time grid of the game becomes arbitrarily ﬁne.
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Similarly, the leader makes all sales from its date of entry until the
follower’s date of entry. During this time, the leader can extract the entire
consumers’ surplus VlN as revenue. This leads to the following expression
for discounted proﬁts of the leader:
πL = e
−rtl ∫ tf
0
θtlNe
−rxdx = e−rtl θNtl
r
(1− e−rtf )
Maximizing this with respect to tl, we obtain an optimal entry date of
t∗l =
1
r
. We will call this the ”stand alone” or the ”maturation” entry date
for the leader. This is the date of introduction that would maximize ﬁrm
A’s proﬁts under the assumption that ﬁrm B will introduce its product later,
after its proﬁt-maximizing delay. It will become important later in the paper
to note that the leader’s optimal introduction date is independent of the
follower’s entry date. In other words, the leader’s entry date is determined
by the trade-oﬀ between time of entry and the level of proﬁt (quality of
output) attainable per period. The follower’s entry date aﬀects the level of
proﬁt earned, but not this basic trade-oﬀ and so does not aﬀect the choice
of entry date by the leader.
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Having described the proﬁt-maximizing introduction dates of both leader
and follower, we can now characterize the (unique) subgame perfect equilib-
rium outcome of the game.10 This is illustrated in ﬁgure 1, where the hori-
zontal axis measures the date of introduction of the leader. The discounted
value of the follower’s proﬁts, ΠF , decreases as the leader waits longer to
introduce. On the other hand, given the anticipated optimal reaction of the
follower, the discounted value of the leader’s proﬁts, ΠL, attains its maximum
at tM = 1/r. Π
F intersects ΠL at time tp. One of two situations might arise.
10We will limit ourselves to pure strategy equilibria.
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If tp is larger than tM then both ﬁrms are happy to wait until tM , where one
of them introduces ﬁrst.11 If tp is smaller than tM the proﬁts of the follower
at tM are lower than the proﬁts of the leader. The follower would, therefore,
prefer to preempt the other ﬁrm by moving a little bit before tM . In this way,
the ﬁrst introduction at tM can no longer be an equilibrium. The incentive
to preempt persists as long as leading is more proﬁtable than following. The
equilibrium outcome is, therefore, for one ﬁrm to introduce ﬁrst at tp, where
the leader and the follower make the same proﬁts. The ”preemption” date,
tp, is formally deﬁned as the time of ﬁrst introduction equalizing the proﬁts
of the ﬁrst and second movers, i.e., tp is such that:
πL(tf , tp) = πf (tf,tp)
or, substituting tf from above and simplifying,
tp(1− e−1) = e−1r
This calculation yields a preemption time of tp = 1
r
e−1
1−e−1 <
1
r
= tM ,
ensuring a unique (up to a permutation of the two ﬁrms) subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game where one ﬁrm introduces at tp and the other follows
at tp + t
∗
f = tp +
1
r
.12.
11At tM the proﬁts of the follower exceed those of the leader. This does not mean
that the ’leader’ has an incentive to wait further. In any pure strategy equilibrium, each
ﬁrm knows whether it is destined to be leader or follower. Hence the leader maximizes its
proﬁts by stopping at tM . See Dutta and Rustichini (1993).
12For a formal proof that this is the unique subgame perfect outcome, see Dutta and
Rustichini (1993) or Prokop, Regibeau and Rockett (1993).
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The welfare of the home country, computed as the unweighted sum of
consumer surplus and the proﬁt of the home ﬁrm discounted at time 0 is:
WA =
∫ tp+t∗∗f
to Nθtpe
−rxdx +
∫∞
tp+t∗∗f
Nθtpe
−rxdx =
∫∞
tp
Nθtpe
−rxdx =
e
− e−1
1−e−1 Nθ
r2
[ e
−1
1−e−1 ]
where we have assumed that the domestic ﬁrm has introduced ﬁrst. Since
the proﬁts of the leader and follower are equalized, the welfare of country A
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would be the same if we had assumed that the foreign ﬁrm had introduced
ﬁrst. The components of this welfare function are shown in ﬁgure 2. The
domestic ﬁrm introduces at time tl and captures instantaneous proﬁts equal
to the quality of its product. This quality corresponds to the height of the
ﬁrst rectangle. At tl + tf the foreign ﬁrm introduces a product of higher
quality. The quality advantage of the foreign ﬁrm is the height of the
upper rectangle. This quality diﬀerential is completely appropriated by the
foreign ﬁrm leaving domestic consumers, and hence the home country, with
an instantaneous surplus equal to the height of the lower rectangle. Since
this height is equal to the quality of the domestic product, the instantaneous
welfare of the home country is constant from the date of ﬁrst introduction
onwards. The welfare of the foreign country is equal to the discounted proﬁts
of the foreign ﬁrm, that is:
WB =
∫∞
tp+t∗∗f
Nθt∗fe
−rxdx = Nθ
r2
e−1e−
e−1
1−e−1
To be able to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of trade policies we must also
understand the socially optimal pattern of introduction. Consider ﬁrst the
benchmark where both ﬁrms are domestic ﬁrms. This will give us the world
welfare maximizing dates of introduction. We can write
W =
∫ tl+tf
tl
Nθtle
−rxdx +
∫∞
tl+tf
Nθ(tl + tf )e
−rxdx
Maximizing this expression with respect to tl and tf yields the socially
optimal dates of introduction tl =
1−e−1
r
and tf =
1
r
so that the second ﬁrm
Administrative Delays as Barriers to Trade 15
introduces at 1
r
(2− e−1). The delay between ﬁrst and second introductions
is the same as would be chosen by the ﬁrms. On the other hand, the
socially optimal date of ﬁrst introduction comes earlier than the privately
optimal stand alone date of introduction: while the leader only cares about
its own proﬁts, the social planner considers the fact that a later date of
ﬁrst introduction also delays the introduction of the better quality second-
generation product.
Now consider the situation where the social planner can still choose both
tl and tf but A is a domestic ﬁrm and B is foreign. One can show
13 that the
welfare of the home country is maximized if the home ﬁrm introduces ﬁrst at
time tl =
1
r
. The introduction date of the foreign follower is irrelevant. The
intuition for this result is straightforward. Since the foreign ﬁrm captures all
of the surplus that it creates, the social planner only cares about maximizing
the discounted value of the value created by the domestic ﬁrm. As the
domestic ﬁrm also captures the whole consumer surplus during its period of
monopoly, the socially optimal date of introduction is equal to the privately
optimal ’stand alone’ date of introduction14. At the social optimum we have
W SA =
θN
r2
e−1. Hence we see that, in the presence of a foreign ﬁrm, the
socially optimal introduction date is later than the equilibrium preemption
date tp. Moreover, the social planner is not indiﬀerent as to the order of
13See Appendix A, section 3.
14The domestic ﬁrm only captures the value θtl from tl to tl + tf while country A as a
whole enjoys this surplus from tl to inﬁnity. This just means that the discounted proﬁts
of the domestic ﬁrms are only equal to a ﬁxed proportion of the discounted welfare of the
home country so that their maximand is the same.
Administrative Delays as Barriers to Trade 16
introduction: the country is better oﬀ if its home ﬁrm moves ﬁrst.15 Policy
makers will therefore be interested in any instrument that can delay the date
of ﬁrst introduction and ensure that the home ﬁrm moves ﬁrst.
3 Tariﬀs
Assume that the home country may impose a permanent per unit tariﬀ, µ,
on the imports of the foreign ﬁrm. As we have just seen, for a given date of
introduction by the domestic ﬁrm, the introduction of a second-generation
product by the foreign ﬁrm does not aﬀect the welfare of the home country.
The only consequence of the foreign ﬁrm’s entry is that the instantaneous
proﬁt of the domestic ﬁrm now becomes the surplus captured by domestic
consumers. Therefore, the home country would be better oﬀ if it could
simply exclude the foreign ﬁrm from the market. This would ensure that the
domestic ﬁrm introduces at its stand alone date t∗l = 1/r, which is the same
as the socially optimal date of introduction. Exclusion amounts to setting
µ → ∞. Any other tariﬀ would eventually be overcome, as the foreign ﬁrm
would simply wait until the quality of its product has improved enough to
outweigh its unit cost disadvantage.
The question is, then, whether the country can do better than this by
capturing some of the additional surplus created by the foreign ﬁrm. The
answer to this question is ’yes’. Indeed, by setting an appropriate tariﬀ, the
15This is because, for all tl > tp, the discounted proﬁts of the leader exceed those of the
follower. See Figure 1.
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home country can ensure that its domestic ﬁrm moves ﬁrst, that it does so
at the socially optimal time tl = 1/r, and that the discounted value of tariﬀ
revenues conditional on the foreign ﬁrm moving last are maximized.
We assume that the home country can commit to a tariﬀ level µ at time
zero.16 This tariﬀ can drastically aﬀect the nature of the subgame perfect
equilibrium. Let us ﬁrst consider the optimal waiting time of the follower.
If the domestic ﬁrm moves last, its optimal waiting time is still tfA =
1
r
. If
the foreign ﬁrm moves last, however, its discounted proﬁts are now:
πfB = e
−rtf ∫∞
0
N(θtf − µ)e−rxdx = e−rtf Nr (θtf − µ)
Maximizing this expression with respect to tf results in an optimal entry
date of tfB =
1
r
+ µ
θ
. Hence, the tariﬀ increases the delay in entry of the foreign
ﬁrm when it is a follower. Intuitively, the tariﬀ does not aﬀect the marginal
gain from waiting since the ﬁrm can still fully appropriate any increase in
quality beyond the quality oﬀered by the domestic incumbent. On the other
hand, the tariﬀ decreases the marginal cost of waiting since it reduces the
level of instantaneous proﬁts that must be forgone.17
16The consequemces of relaxing this assumption are discussed in Section 5.
17This suggests that an ad valorem tariﬀ would leave the date of introduction of a
foreign follower unchanged since it would aﬀect the level of instantaneous proﬁt and the
marginal beneﬁts from quality increase proportionally. However this neutrality stems
from assuming zero marginal costs of production. If the marginal cost is positive, it is
easy to show that an ad valorem tariﬀ would also delay the introduction of the foreign
product.
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Turning to the introduction time of the leader, we see that the stand
alone entry date of the domestic ﬁrm is not aﬀected by the tariﬀ in spite
of the fact that the domestic ﬁrm knows that the foreign follower will now
introduce later. This is because, as mentioned earlier, the optimal delay of
the follower only aﬀects the discounted proﬁts of the stand alone leader as
a multiplicative factor, i.e. πL =
∫ tl+tf
tl
Nθtle
−rxdx = Nθ
r
e−rtl(1− e−rtf ). On
the other hand, the stand alone entry date of a foreign leader is aﬀected by
the tariﬀ in exactly the same manner as the foreign ﬁrm’s optimal following
delay was: the tariﬀ decreases the marginal cost of waiting but leaves the
marginal beneﬁt unchanged. More formally, we have:
πlB = e
−rtl ∫ t
f
A
0
N(θtl − µ)e−rxdx = N(θtl − µ)e−rtl(1− e−rtfA)
Notice that this expression has the same form as that of πfB, above, with
the exception of the upper limit of integration. The proﬁt-maximizing entry
date, tµB =
1
r
+ µ
θ
, is therefore the same as the foreign ﬁrm’s optimal delay
tfB. A positive tariﬀ induces a ’stand alone’ foreign leader to delay its date
of entry.
We still need to determine the eﬀect of the tariﬀ on the preemption dates.
In the symmetric case, tp was obtained by equating the discounted proﬁts of a
leader to the discounted proﬁts of a follower. Because of the tariﬀ, however,
we must now distinguish between the preemption dates of the domestic and
foreign ﬁrms. The preemption date of the domestic ﬁrm is the date that
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equalizes the discounted proﬁts of that ﬁrm as a stand alone leader to its
discounted proﬁts as a follower, i.e., tl such that:
∫ tl+tfB
tl
Nθtle
−rxdx =
∫∞
tl+t
f
A
NθtfAe
−rxdx
which yields tPA =
1
r
e−1
1−e−1e−r
µ
θ
. Notice that this date is decreasing in µ: in
the presence of a positive tariﬀ the domestic ﬁrm is willing to move earlier –
in order be ﬁrst – than it was under free trade. The intuition for this result
is simple. Conditional on a ﬁrst entry date tl, the proﬁts of the domestic
ﬁrm as a follower are not aﬀected by the tariﬀ: it still introduces at tl +
1
r
and
makes instantaneous proﬁts of Nθ
r
. On the other hand, for any given tl,
the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁts as a leader increase because the foreign follower
now introduces its product later. That is, the domestic leader now enjoys a
longer period of monopoly. Hence, at the initial tariﬀ-free preemption date
tp, the domestic leader’s proﬁts with the tariﬀ exceed the domestic follower’s
proﬁts with the tariﬀ. This makes the domestic ﬁrm willing to move even
earlier in order to be ﬁrst.
Similarly, the preemption date of the foreign ﬁrm is the date tl that
equalizes the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts as a leader to its proﬁts as a follower, that
is:
∫ tl+tfA
tl
N [θtl − µ]e−rxdx =
∫∞
tl+t
f
B
N [θtfB − µ]e−rxdx
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which yields tPB =
1
r
e−1
1−e−1 e
− rµ
θ + µ
θ
. This date is increasing in µ: in the
presence of a tariﬀ, the foreign ﬁrm is less willing to move early in order to be
ﬁrst than under free trade. The intuition is that, in the thought experiment
that deﬁnes its preemption date, the foreign ﬁrm has an extra degree of
freedom to react to the tariﬀ when it is a follower. For a given date of
introduction, tp, by the domestic leader, the foreign ﬁrm can adjust its own
date of introduction to lessen the adverse eﬀect of the tariﬀ. On the other
hand, the proﬁts of the foreign ﬁrm as a leader are computed for the same
given date of ﬁrst introduction so that no such adjustment is possible. Hence
the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts as a leader are hurt more by the tariﬀ than the
foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts as a follower.
In the free trade equilibrium, we had tp < t
∗
l = 1/r. The introduction of
a tariﬀ leaves tlA = 1/r, increases t
l
B to
1
r
+ µ
θ
, decreases tPA, and increases
tPB. This leaves us with two possible situations, depending on the size of the
tariﬀ compared to some threshold level, µ#.:
case 1: µ < µ#: tPA < t
P
B < t
l
A < t
l
B
case 2: µ > µ#: tPA < t
l
A < t
P
B < t
l
B
In the ﬁrst of these two cases, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in
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pure strategies has ﬁrm A introduce ﬁrst at tPB.
18 Intuitively, the domestic
ﬁrm is willing to move as early as tPA in order to be ﬁrst. Still, it prefers to
move (ﬁrst) as closely as possible to its stand alone date tlA. Therefore, ﬁrm
A waits up to the date, tPB, where ﬁrm B would be willing to preempt it. In
the second case, ﬁrm A knows that ﬁrm B cannot credibly preempt before
tPB. Since t
P
B > t
l
A, A can wait until its preferred date of introduction and
move ﬁrst at tlA. One can show that the welfare-maximizing tariﬀ must be
high enough to lead to this second type of equilibrium.
Proposition 1 The welfare maximizing tariﬀ is µ∗ = θ
r
. At the optimal
tariﬀ, the domestic ﬁrm introduces ﬁrst at time tl =
1
r
and the foreign ﬁrm
introduces last at date 3
r
.
Proof. : See Appendix A, sections 1 and 2.
The level of home welfare under the optimal tariﬀ policy is:
W µA =
∫∞
1/r
Nθ(1
r
)e−rxdx +
∫∞
3/r
N θ
r
e−rxdx = Nθ
r2
e−1(1 + e−2)
The optimal tariﬀ increases the welfare of the home country in three ways.
First, it allows the domestic ﬁrm to introduce ﬁrst at its preferred stand alone
date of tl = 1/r, increasing its discounted proﬁts. Second, the tariﬀ raises
the quality of the home product. This imposes a more severe competitive
constraint on the foreign entrant, ensuring that domestic customers obtain
18For a formal characterization of these equilibria, see Prokop, Regibeau and Rockett
(1993).
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a larger surplus after the introduction of the second-generation product by
the foreign ﬁrm. Finally, the government collects positive discounted tariﬀ
revenues.
The foreign ﬁrm clearly suﬀers from the tariﬀ due to the loss of tariﬀ
revenue and its later introduction date. The eﬀect of the tariﬀ on world
welfare is not a priori obvious. Because we have inelastic demands, the tariﬀ
revenue is a pure transfer that leaves world welfare unchanged. The eﬀect of
the tariﬀ on the dates of introduction actually lowers world welfare, for two
reasons. First, as we saw in our benchmark model, the worldwide optimal
delay between the two introductions is equal to the delay, 1/r, that ﬁrms
would choose under free trade. The tariﬀ increases this delay, resulting in
a loss of welfare. Second, the tariﬀ unduly postpones the introduction of
the ﬁrst generation product. Even though the date chosen under optimal
tariﬀ protection, 1/r, is optimal for the home country, it fails to take into
account that later introduction also postpones the arrival of the superior
second-generation product. In fact, as the worldwide optimal date of ﬁrst
introduction is almost identical to the equilibrium date of introduction under
free trade19, the tariﬀ-induced delay actually decreases world welfare.
Proposition 2 World welfare is lower under the optimal tariﬀ than under
free trade
19The worldwide optimal date is 1−e
−1
r , which is higher than the preemption date
e−1
r(1−e−1) .
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Proof. Under free trade, world welfare is equal to W F = e
−1Nθ
r2
[e
− e−1
1−e−1 ][2−e
−1
1−e−1 ].
At the optimal tariﬀ we have W µ =
∫∞
1/r
Nθ(1
r
)e−rxdx +
∫∞
3/r
Nθ(2
r
)e−rxdx =
e−1Nθ
r2
[1 + 2e−2] < W F .
4 Administrative Delay
We analyze the case where country A may impose a delay, λ, on the foreign
ﬁrm before it can actually sell its products in the home market. We assume
that ﬁrm B cannot continue improving the quality of its product once the
delay has begun, reﬂecting the idea that λ represents an administrative delay
required to gain approval for sale of a particular product as opposed to sale
by a particular ﬁrm in market A.
Let us now recalculate the equilibrium entry dates for the ﬁrms. If the
foreign ﬁrm moves last, its discounted proﬁts can be written as follows:
πfB = e
−r(tf+λ) ∫∞
0
Nθtfe
−rxdx = e−r(tf+λ) θN
r
tf
where tf is the time that elapses between the introduction of the home
product and the date at which the foreign ﬁrm begins the approval process.
Accordingly, we will refer to tf as the ’application delay’. Note that, because
the design of the product (and, hence, its quality) is ﬁxed at the beginning
of the administrative delay, the per period proﬁt of the foreign ﬁrm does not
include an allowance for an increment in quality while the approval process
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runs its course. Maximizing this expression with respect to tf yields a proﬁt-
maximizing delay of tλfB =
1
r
. This means that the foreign product is actually
for sale in the market 1
r
+ λ later than the home product. The entry delay
that would be chosen by a domestic follower is the same as in the baseline
case, i.e. tλfA =
1
r
.
If the foreign ﬁrm is a leader, its discounted proﬁts can be written as
follows:
πLB =
∫ tλfA+tL
tl+λ
θNtLe
−rxdx = (e
−rλ−e−rtf )θN
r
[tLe
−rtl ]
provided that λ ≤ tλfA = 1r .20 Maximizing this expression with respect to
tl yields an optimal application date of t
λ
lB =
1
r
, corresponding to an optimal
introduction date of 1
r
+ λ. Note that the administrative delay does not
aﬀect the per period proﬁt that can be earned by the leader since quality
is ﬁxed at the beginning of the delay. Rather, the delay merely shortens
the period during which proﬁts can be earned. This is the case as long as
the administrative delay is short enough that there is no change in the order
of entry that has been assumed (i.e., the foreign ﬁrm is the leader and the
domestic ﬁrm is the follower). In other words, the administrative delay must
not exceed 1
r
.
20If the administrative delay exceeds 1r , then a foreign leader always ﬁnds itself pre-
empted by the domestic follower as the domestic ﬁrm optimally enters at tl+ 1r . Therefore,
the foreign ﬁrm never moves ﬁrst, letting the domestic ﬁrm introduce at tl = 1r .
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If the leader is the domestic ﬁrm, its proﬁts can be written as:
πLA = e
−rtl ∫ tf+λ
0
θNtLe
−rxdx = e−rtL θNtL
r
(1− e−r(tf+λ))
so that the administrative delay prolongs the proﬁt period, but does not
aﬀect the trade-oﬀ that determines the optimal entry time. Therefore, the
entry time for a domestic leader is the same as that of a foreign leader:
tλLA =
1
r
.
We can now assess the impact of an administrative delay on the preemp-
tion dates of the two ﬁrms. Equating the proﬁts for a domestic leader to
those of a domestic follower, and substituting in the optimal waiting times
of the followers, results in the following expression:
e−rtl
∫ tλfB
0 θNtle
−rxdx = e−r(tl+t
λ
fA)
∫∞
0
θNtλfAe
−rxdx⇐⇒
tl(1− e−1e−rλ) = e−1r
where the tl on the right hand side of the ﬁrst expression stands for the
application date of the foreign leader. The preemption date of the domestic
ﬁrm is tλPA =
1
r
e−1
1−e−1e−rλ . This is earlier than the preemption date in the
baseline case. Intuitively, for a given date of ﬁrst entry tl, the administrative
delay does not aﬀect the domestic ﬁrm’s discounted proﬁts as a follower
but it increases the proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm as a leader by delaying the
introduction of the second-generation product. Hence, at the preemption
time of the baseline case, the domestic ﬁrms has higher proﬁts as a leader
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than as a follower so that it is willing to move even earlier in order to move
ﬁrst.
To obtain the foreign preemption date we equate the proﬁts of the foreign
ﬁrm, assuming that it leads, with the proﬁts of the foreign ﬁrm, assuming
that it follows, to obtain:
e−rtl
∫ tλfA
λ θNtle
−rxdx = e−r(tl+t
λ
fB+λ)
∫∞
0
θNtλfBe
−rxdx
⇐⇒ e−rtlNtl(e−rλ− e−1) = e−r(t1+ 1r +λ)θN(1r )
so that the earliest date at which the foreign ﬁrm would be willing to
preempt is tλPB =
e−1e−rλ
r(e−rλ−e−1) . Note that, at a zero administrative delay,
this preemption date is the same as the baseline preemption date. Further,
∂tBL
∂λ
> 021. Intuitively, the administrative delay hurts the discounted proﬁts
of a foreign follower less than those of a foreign leader because the fruitless
period between application and actual introduction intervenes at a later date.
This makes the foreign ﬁrm less eager to move early in order to be ﬁrst.
Summarizing, an administrative delay λ does not aﬀect the stand alone
date of a domestic leader, postpones the stand alone date of a foreign leader
by exactly λ, decreases the preemption date of the domestic ﬁrm and in-
creases the preemption date of the foreign ﬁrm. For small values of λ, then,
21∂tBL/∂λ =
−e−1[{1− (e−rλ/(e−rλ − e−1))}e−rλ/(e−rλ − e−1)]
which is positive for λ < 1r .
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we have tλPA < t
λ
PB < t
λ
lA =
1
r
< tλlB =
1
r
+ λ. In the unique subgame per-
fect equilibrium, the domestic ﬁrm introduces ﬁrst at tλPB. The foreign ﬁrm
applies for approval at time tλPB +
1
r
and begins selling its product after a
further delay of λ. This ranking remains valid as long as:
tλPB ≤ tλlA ⇐⇒ e−rλ ≥ e
−1
1−e−1
For all greater values of λ, we have tλPA < t
λ
lA =
1
r
< tλPB < t
λ
lB =
1
r
+ λ so
that the domestic ﬁrm introduces ﬁrst at time 1
r
.
As we saw in the benchmark case, 1
r
is the welfare maximizing date of ﬁrst
introduction for the home country. Moreover, home welfare is independent
of the date of introduction of the second-generation product. This implies
that home welfare is maximized by setting the administrative delay at or
above λ∗such that e−rλ
∗
= e
−1
1−e−1 . With the optimal delay, the welfare of
Country A is:
W λA =
e−1θN
r2
= W SA < W
µ
A
In other words, just like the optimal tariﬀ, the optimal delay ensures the
best possible timing of product introduction for country A but it does not
yield any tariﬀ revenue. Therefore, as long as tariﬀs are not bounded, the
home country will maximize welfare by using its trade policy and will not
discriminate against the foreign ﬁrm in its administrative approval process.
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Administrative delays will only be used if trade liberalization decrease the
maximum allowable tariﬀ signiﬁcantly below µ = θ
r
.
We can now compute world welfare under the optimal delay, W λ
∗
and
compare it to world welfare under the optimal tariﬀ, W µ
∗
:
W λ
∗
=
∫∞
1/r
θN(1
r
)e−rxdx +
∫∞
2
r
+λ
θN(1
r
)e−rxdx = Nθ
r2
e−1(1 + e−1e−rλ
∗
)
W µ
∗
= Nθ
r2
e−1(1 + 2e−2)
From the deﬁnition of the optimal administrative delay, however, we know
that:
e−rλ
∗
= e
−1
1−e−1 < 2
Therefore, from the point of view of world welfare, the optimal tariﬀ is
preferable to the optimal administrative delay. This result is not a priori
obvious since tariﬀ revenues are a pure transfer that has no eﬀect on world
welfare, and the date of ﬁrst introduction is the same under both policies.
The only diﬀerences between the two policies lie in the timing of introduction
of second generation products and in their quality. On the one hand, second
generation products are introduced earlier with the optimal delay than with
the optimal tariﬀ22. On the other hand, with the delay, the quality of the
second generation product only keeps increasing over the interval between
22Formally, 2r >
1
r +λ
∗. At the optimal administrative delay,e−rλ = e
−1
1−e−1 and the right
hand side of this equation is strictly greater than e−1. This implies that λ∗ is strictly less
than 1r .
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the ﬁrst introduction and the date of application of the foreign ﬁrm. This is
followed by a period of length λ∗during which the product goes through the
approval process without any further quality improvements. This contrasts
with the tariﬀ regime, where the quality of the second-generation product
keeps increasing over the whole interval between the two introduction dates.
This second eﬀect dominates.
Finally, the foreign ﬁrm is better oﬀ under the optimal delay, where it
earns discounted proﬁts of Nθe
−2
(1−e−1)r2 , than under the optimal tariﬀ policy,
where its discounted proﬁts would be equal to Nθe
−2
r2
. In other words, the
disadvantage of facing a period, λ∗,of stunted product development is out-
weighed by the burden of the optimal tariﬀ.
5 Trade Liberalization
Under the GATT/WTO, trade liberalization has taken the form of mutually
agreed reductions in quotas and/or tariﬀs. While signiﬁcant eﬀort has been
expended to also restrict the use of other, less obvious, discriminatory policy
instruments the results so far appear to be modest. Accordingly we will
assume that trade liberalization sets an upper limit on the tariﬀ that can
be used by the home country, but that it does not constrain the use of
administrative delays.
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The eﬀects of a drastic trade liberalization are quite striking. If tariﬀs can
no longer be used at all, the home country will switch from the optimal tariﬀ
policy to the optimal policy of delay. As we have just seen, this switch would
result in lower welfare for the home country and the world, even though it
would be applauded by the foreign ﬁrm. In other words, the prohibition
on tariﬀs would force the home country to rely on an instrument that is less
eﬃcient both for itself and for the world economy.
We can illustrate the eﬀect of less extreme degrees of trade liberalization
in ﬁgure 3. The tariﬀ cap is on the horizontal axis and the combination of
tariﬀ and delay that maximizes domestic welfare is on the vertical axis. Let
us consider a progressive tightening of the tariﬀ cap. For values of µmax
in [µ#, θ
r
], the optimal policy of the home country is to set the maximum
tariﬀ allowed and not to impose any administrative delay. Such a policy
still ensures that the ﬁrst introduction occurs at the optimal date 1
r
and that
the discounted value of tariﬀ revenues is as large as possible. Interestingly,
this policy is still optimal for a range below µ#: even though tightening the
cap now implies that the domestic ﬁrm introduces earlier than 1
r
, the home
country still prefers not to use administrative delays. Intuitively, for values
of µ close to µ#, the gains from pushing the introduction date back toward
1
r
are small23. On the other hand, delaying the ﬁrst introduction involves a
23Formally, this follows from the envelope theorem.
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signiﬁcant decrease in the discounted values of the tariﬀ revenues24. As the
tariﬀ cap is tightened further, one reaches a point where the marginal beneﬁt
of delaying the ﬁrst introduction outweighs the marginal cost of pushing back
the date at which tariﬀ revenues are collected. From that point on, the home
country uses both the maximum possible tariﬀ and a positive administrative
delay.
24In the absence of tariﬀ cap, there was no such trade oﬀ since the value of µ that
maximized the discounted value of tariﬀ revenues was high enough to also ensure ﬁrst
introduction at 1r . The diﬀerence here is that the tariﬀ rate is ﬁxed at µmax so that
further delay does not add to tariﬀ revenues.
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As long as the home country does not rely on administrative delays, trade
liberalization increases world welfare. Hence, for µmax ∈ [µ#, θr ], liberaliza-
tion decreases the delay between ﬁrst and second introduction, bringing it
closer to the optimal value of 1
r
. Further liberalization has the additional
beneﬁt of also speeding up the date of introduction of the ﬁrst product.
However, once the domestic country begins to impose a substantial adminis-
trative delay, the dates of introduction of the two products get pushed back,
so that further liberalization results in lower levels of world welfare.
Proposition 3 Moderate trade liberalization increases world welfare. Fur-
ther liberalization gives rise to administrative delays and decreases world wel-
fare.
Proof. See Appendix A section 4.
6 Robustness
6.1 Credibility of the tariﬀ and delay policies
We have so far adopted the traditional timing of trade policy models by as-
suming that the level of tariﬀs and administrative delays could be committed
to before the ﬁrms made their entry choices. However, the extent to which
governments can credibly commit to various types of economic policies is a,
yet unresolved, empirical question. It is, therefore, interesting to examine
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how our analysis is aﬀected if we vary the commitment power of the policy
maker.
The optimal administrative delay obtained in Section 3 remains optimal
at any point of the game and is, therefore, credible in the absence of any
exogenous commitment power. After the domestic ﬁrm moves ﬁrst, the
policy maker becomes indiﬀerent between all possible values of the delay
because, from then on, the instantaneous welfare of the country is equal to
NqA whatever the date of introduction and quality of the foreign follower
happens to be. If the foreign ﬁrm were to move ﬁrst then the administrative
delay would have no eﬀect on the rest of the game so that, again, the policy
maker would be indiﬀerent between all possible values of λ.
The optimal tariﬀ policy derived in Section 3 clearly suﬀers from one type
of time-inconsistency: once the foreign ﬁrm has actually introduced its own
product, country A would wish to revise its optimal tariﬀ. By setting a unit
tariﬀ equal to the quality advantage of the foreign product, country A would
appropriate the entire surplus created by the second product introduction,
leaving the foreign ﬁrm with zero proﬁts. If there is any arbitrarily small but
positive cost of entry, such an opportunistic policy on the part of country A
would keep the foreign ﬁrm out of the industry altogether. Since country A
is better oﬀ when the foreign ﬁrm actually enters, one can at least say that
it has an incentive to commit not to revert to this opportunistic tariﬀ policy
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if it possibly can.
On the other hand, µ = θ/r remains the optimal value of the tariﬀ as
long as the foreign ﬁrm has not introduced its product. To see this, suppose
that the home government could change the tariﬀ once the home ﬁrm has
introduced ﬁrst. At that point, the home government only cares about max-
imizing the discounted value of its tariﬀ revenues. The value of the superior
quality embedded in second generation products is completely appropriated
by the foreign ﬁrm and does not enter into the domestic welfare function.
Hence the government chooses the value of µ that maximizes:
∫∞
tµfB
µe−rxdx, where tµfB =
1
r
+ µ
θ
yielding µ∗ = θ
r
, which is the same as the optimal tariﬀ that would be
chosen at the beginning of the game.
6.2 Demand
We have assumed that consumer demand for either product is perfectly in-
elastic at any point in time. Inelastic demands have the convenient property
that a monopolist would behave in a socially optimal way, as it is able to ap-
propriate the whole consumer surplus created by its product. This helps to
ensure that any departure from the socially optimal pattern of introduction
has its source in the rivalry between the domestic and foreign ﬁrms. Still,
inelastic demands have some important limitations.
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The ﬁrst limitation is that import tariﬀs do not result in the usual dead-
weight loss. Hence inelastic demands bias the world welfare comparison in
favor of the tariﬀ policy. The second peculiarity of inelastic demands is that
they allow each quality leader to fully appropriate the value of its quality ad-
vantage. This is why the home government in our model was indiﬀerent as
to the precise level of quality attained by a foreign follower: local consumers
could not appropriate any part of this increased quality. To investigate the
eﬀect of this special feature, we reconsider the analysis of Sections 1 through
4 under the assumption that the foreign ﬁrm can only appropriate a frac-
tion, α, of its quality advantage. Hence the instantaneous proﬁts of a foreign
leader would be αθtl and the proﬁts of a foreign follower would be αθtf .
When a tariﬀ is imposed, we assume that a proportion, α, is borne by the
foreign ﬁrm and a proportion, 1− α, by local consumers.25
25This assumption would hold for linear demands, where the proportion between proﬁt
and consumer surplus is independent of the tariﬀ level. Alternative assumptions about
the sharing of the tariﬀ burden would not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the nature of the results.
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With this speciﬁcation, (1 − α) enters all proﬁt maximization problems
as a multiplicative factor, leaving the dates of introduction of leaders and
followers as well as preemption dates unchanged. Since these dates are in-
dependent of α, the eﬀect of tariﬀs and delays on the behavior of the ﬁrms
is still as described in the previous sections. On the other hand, the welfare
function of country A now includes some of the surplus created by the foreign
ﬁrm, so that country A now cares about not overly delaying the introduction
of the foreign product. This makes the use of both delays and tariﬀs less
attractive, for two reasons. First, for a given date of introduction by the
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domestic leader, administrative delays and tariﬀs push back the introduction
of the foreign good. Second, tariﬀs and delays also defer the date of intro-
duction of the domestic leader, further postponing the introduction of the
second product.
The optimal tariﬀ and delay policies are shown as a function of α in
ﬁgure 4. As expected, both instruments are used less aggressively when α
is low. Interestingly, there is a critical value αo below which the optimal
administrative delay is zero. The intuition for this discrete jump can be
obtained from ﬁgure 5. Country A ’s welfare is made of two parts. The ﬁrst
component, W1, is the value of the product of the domestic ﬁrm. This value
is appropriated by the home ﬁrm from the ﬁrst to the second introduction
and by domestic consumers after that. W1 only depends on the delay λ
through its eﬀect on the date of introduction of the domestic product. As we
saw in the previous sections, W1 is maximized by an introduction date of 1
r
,
which occurs for λ larger than λo. Over this range, then, W1 is independent
of α. Below λo, W1 is increasing in λ. The second component, deﬁned
as W2, represents the share (1 − α) of the foreign ﬁrm’s quality advantage
that is captured by country A. Since a larger delay pushes back the date of
introduction of the foreign product and also freezes its quality for a longer
period, W2 is decreasing in λ. The sum of W1 and W2 is two-peaked, with
a local maximum at λ = 0 and another one at λ∗ > 0. As the share of the
foreign ﬁrm ’s quality advantage appropriated by the home country increases,
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so does the relative importance of W2 and, therefore, the relative height of
the λ = 0 peak. For α < αo then, W is maximized at λ = 0.
26
While the introduction of the parameter α does not aﬀect our positive re-
sults or the qualitative analysis of the home country’s welfare, it can change
the implications of trade liberalization for world welfare. Since α only deter-
mines how surplus is shared between the foreign ﬁrm and country A it does
26See Appendix B for a description of the proofs and simulations on which the results
of this section rely.
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not have any direct eﬀect on world welfare. Its impact comes through the
induced changes in the optimal policies of country A. As long as the optimal
delay is positive, our previous conclusion still holds: world welfare is higher
under country A’s optimal tariﬀ than under its optimal delay. Hence drastic
liberalization would lower world welfare. However, as soon as α hits the crit-
ical value for which the optimal delay jumps to zero, the policy conclusion is
reversed: the optimal delay policy ensures the prevalence of free trade while
the optimal tariﬀ results in undesirably late introductions. Therefore, for α
low enough, drastic trade liberalization would increase world welfare.
7 Conclusion
Despite eﬀorts to reduce formal trade barriers, administrative procedures
still stand out as a source of diﬀerential treatment of foreign and domestic
ﬁrms. In this paper we have focussed on the case of product approval, where
discrimination imposes additional delays on the introduction of new products
by foreign competitors. We have compared the eﬀects of such administrative
delays with those of more traditional trade policy instruments such as tariﬀs.
Using a simple model of the timing of product introduction we have shown
that both tariﬀs and delays postpone the date of introduction of both foreign
and domestic products and, further, allow the domestic ﬁrm to be ﬁrst to
market. It is signiﬁcant that we can show that administrative delays as an
informal trade barrier can achieve such an end, as the use of such a tool
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is feasible within current institutional structure. We also have established
that, if both instruments are available, the domestic country prefers to rely
solely on the tariﬀ. Although obtained for the special case of inelastic
demands, these positive results are rather robust to changes in demand and
cost conditions. While this result is similar to other results comparing less
to more eﬃcient trade instruments, our presentation is novel in several ways.
First, administrative delays have not been studied formally in the literature,
so it is signiﬁcant that we can illustrate how the result on eﬃciency carries
over in this case. Second, we can illustrate the mechanism by which the tariﬀ
dominates the administrative delay. Clearly, this diﬀers from the mechanism
by which tariﬀs dominate other instruments. We also have compared welfare
under the domestic country’s optimal tariﬀ policy to the level of welfare
attained under its optimal delay policy. While the foreign country is better
oﬀ with administrative delays, world welfare is higher under the optimal
tariﬀ. This implies that a drastic trade liberalization that bans the use
of tariﬀs but is ineﬀective in controlling less transparent policies like delays
would actually make the world worse oﬀ. In fact one can show that, while
imposing a binding cap on tariﬀs initially increases worldwide welfare, there is
a level below which further tightening the cap is undesirable. In this way, we
analyze both drastic and partial liberalization and their eﬀects on welfare.
Our normative results are signiﬁcantly less robust than the results on the
ﬁrms’ behavior, however. In particular one can show that they are sensitive
to the share of the quality advantage of the (late-moving) foreign ﬁrm that
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can be appropriated by domestic consumers. This in turn would depend on
the precise speciﬁcation of demand and on the type of competition between
domestic and foreign ﬁrms. Our conclusion that drastic trade liberalization
would decrease world welfare should therefore be taken as a cautionary tale,
not as robust guidance for policy. A more general normative insight from the
paper is that constraining the use of a subset of trade-related instruments
does not necessarily lead to more palatable equilibrium policies27.
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9 Appendix A
1. Derivation of the optimal tariﬀ in case 2
The home country’s welfare is written as follows:
WA =
∫∞
1/r
Nθ(1
r
)e−rxdx +
∫∞
2
r
+µ
θ
Nµe−rxdx
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Maximizing this expression with respect to µ yields µ∗ = θ
r
.
2. Showing that µ∗ is the globally optimal tariﬀ for the home
country when only the tariﬀ may be used.
Welfare of Country A is composed of two terms, as written above: a term
that represents the sum of proﬁts and consumers’ surplus net of the tariﬀ
revenue, and a second term reﬂecting tariﬀ revenue:
WA =
∫∞
tl
Nθtle
−rxdx +
∫∞
tl+t
µ
fB
µNe−rxdx
It is straightforward to show that the ﬁrst term is maximized at tl =
1
r
.
Therefore, to prove that the optimal tariﬀ occurs for µ > µ# we only need
to show that the second term is maximized for µ > µ# . We maximize the
following expression with respect to the tariﬀ level:
max e−rtLe−etf Nµ
r
subject to:
tf =
1
r
+ µ
θ
tl =
e−1e−
rµ
θ
r(1−e−1) +
µ
θ
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The ﬁrst order conditions of this maximization problem are:
e−rtLe−rtf N
r
[1− rµ(t′L + t′f )] = 0
where the primes indicate ﬁrst derivatives, which can be calculated as
follows:
t
′
L =
1
θ
(1− e−1e−
rµ
θ
1−e−1 ) > 0
t
′
f =
1
θ
>0
In order to have an interior maximum the expression in square bracket in
the ﬁrst order condition must be equal to zero. This expression is positive at
tl =
1
r
and decreases in the tariﬀ level (i.e., its derivative with respect to the
tariﬀ is negative for µ < θ
r
) . This implies that any possible interior solution
must occur for tl >
1
r
or, equivalently, for µ > µ#.
This means that the maximum of expected proﬁt over the range µ ∈
[0, µ#] must be at a corner. Clearly, expected tariﬀ revenues cannot be
maximized for µ = 0. They cannot be maximized for µ = µ# either: at
this point the expression for discounted tariﬀ revenues is continuous and, by
deﬁnition of µ∗ = θ
r
we know that discounted tariﬀ revenues are higher at
µ∗than at µ#.
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3. Derivation of the optimal entry dates for both ﬁrms when
the home country can control both ﬁrms’ entry dates
In order to derive the optimal entry dates for both ﬁrms from the point
of view of Country A, we must maximize welfare with respect to both the
entry dates of the leader and the follower. Since consumers’ surplus is the
same as proﬁts, Country A’s welfare is simply the expression at the top of the
page with the tariﬀ set to zero. This expression is independent of the entry
date of the follower, indicating that the optimal entry date for the follower is
indeterminate. Maximizing the expression with respect to the leader’s entry
date yields an optimal time of entry of tl =
1
r
. Welfare for Country A is the
same as in the monopoly case, not surprisingly.
The optimal entry dates from the point of view of world welfare are
calculated by maximizing world welfare with respect to the entry dates of
the leader and the follower. The welfare of Country A is as speciﬁed in the
previous paragraph, while the welfare of Country B is simply the discounted
proﬁts of the follower, as calculated in the ﬁrst equation of the Appendix
(setting the tariﬀ equal to zero). Maximizing world welfare yields a follower
entry delay of 1
r
(since the optimal date is indeterminate from the point of
Country A, and a delay of 1
r
maximizes the follower’s proﬁts, as in the baseline
case discussed in the text). The ﬁrst order condition that determines the
leader’s entry date is:
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e−rtl θ
r
[1− rtl − e−1] = 0
so that the optimal entry date for the leader is tl =
1−e−1
r
. This is earlier
than the optimal entry date from the point of view of Country A since world
welfare takes into account Country B’s welfare, and from the point of view
of Country B, the leader’s entry date merely serves to postpone the date at
which proﬁts will accrue to Country B. At the world welfare maximizing
entry dates for the two ﬁrms, welfare is as follows:
e1−e
−1
(1− e−1) θN
r2
= WA e
−1 θN
r2
= WB
e−1θN
r2
(1 + ee
−1
(e2 − e)) = W
4. Partial Liberalization.
We ﬁrst consider the range µmax ∈ [µ#, θr ]. The welfare of the home
country has two components, Wo = e
−rtlNθtl and the tariﬀ revenue T =
e−rtle−1e−r
µ
θ µ. The ﬁrst component is maximized by any µ ≥ µ# since
tl =
1
r
for all µ ≥ µ# . Moreover T is concave in µ and argmax T = θ
r
.
Hence, for µ ∈ [0, µmax] argmax T = µmax. Hence the optimal policy is to
set µ = µmax. As the date of ﬁrst introduction is unchanged but the date of
second introduction moves closer to the worldwide optimum, liberalization
over this range increases world welfare.
Now we show that, in the neighborhood of µmax = µ
#, the optimal policy
does not involve a positive administrative delay. In the absence of any delay,
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the optimal tariﬀ policy is still to set µ = µmax as
dWo
dµ
(µ = µmax) > 0
and dT
dµ
(µ = µmax) > 0. At µ = µmax we have
dW
dλ
= ∂Wo
∂tl
dtl
dλ
+ dT
dλ
. At
µ = µ =max= µ
#, ∂Wo
∂tl
= 0 by the envelope theorem (since for µ = µ#,
tl =
1
r
=argmax Wo). Since
dT
dλ
< 0 we have dW
dλ
< 0. One can therefore
ﬁnd an arbitrarily small neighborhood to the left of In the neighborhood of
µ = µ =max= µ
#, for which dW
dλ
remains negative.
The precise shape of the functions displayed in ﬁgure 3 for µmax < µ
#
were obtained through numerical simulations based on Maple V.
10 Appendix B
We now assume that the foreign ﬁrm can only appropriate a share α of its
quality advantage. We ﬁrst show that the introduction of α does not aﬀect
the various dates of introduction. Clearly the maximization problem of
the domestic ﬁrm as a leader or as a follower do not depend on α. The
maximization problem of a foreign follower becomes
Maxtf e
−rtf α[θtf − µ] so that t∗f = 1r + µθ and Maxtf e−rtf+λαθtf so that
t∗f =
1
r
and the delay before actual introduction is 1
r
+ λ.
Similarly, the maximization problems of a foreign leader are:
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Maxtle
−rtlα(θtl− µ)(1− e−rtfA) so that t∗l = 1r + µθ and Maxtle−rtl+λαθtl
so that t∗l =
1
r
and the delay before actual introduction is1
r
+ λ.
The preemption dates of the domestic ﬁrms clearly do not depend on α.
For the foreign ﬁrms, the preemption dates are obtained as follows. With a
tariﬀ,
e−rtpe−1e−r
µ
θ α[ θ
r
+µ−µ] = e−rtpα(θtp−µ)[1−e−1] so that tpB = 1r e
−1
1−e−1 e
− rµ
θ +
µ
θ
. With a delay, e−rtpe−1e−rλα θ
r
= e−rtpαθtp(e−rλ − e−1) so that tpB =
e−1e−rλ
r(e−rλ−e−1) .
Results on optimal policies could not be obtained analytically for all
ranges of parameters. We, therefore, relied on numerical simulations based
on Maple V. The simulations are quite straightforward as the only parame-
ters of the problem are θ and r. In fact, the only magnitude of relevance is
the relative size of these two parameters so that one can set θ = 1 and de-
termine the optimal delay and tariﬀ policies for diﬀerent values of r. As the
qualitative results are the same for all values of r, ﬁgures 4 and 5 in the text
simply show a ’typical’ outcome. The expressions used in the simulations
are:
W (µ) = e
−rtl
r
[θtl + αµe
−1e−r
µ
θ + (1− α)(1
r
+ µ)θe−1e−r
µ
θ ]
W (λ) = e
−rtl
r
[θtl + (1− α) θre−1e−rλ]
WW (µ) = e
−rtl
r
[θtl + θ(
1
r
+ µ)e−1e−r
µ
θ ]
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WW (λ) = e
−rtl
r
[θtl +
θ
r
e−1e−rλ)]
where tl = min[tpB,
1
r
].
